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Foreword | Despite significant 
reductions in recent years, acquisitive 
property crime remains the single largest 
crime category, with over 700,000 
offences recorded annually by police  
in Australia. There is potential to further 
reduce the scale of such offending and 
the subsequent costs to society by 
focusing attention on the design of 
frequently stolen consumer products  
in order to reduce their vulnerability  
to theft. While there is a variety of  
ways of engaging with manufacturers, 
government regulation may ultimately  
be required if other approaches prove 
unsuccessful.
This paper examines the lessons that can 
be learned as a result of the regulation of 
motor manufacturers to install electronic 
immobilisers on all new cars from  
July 2001, which has contributed to 
significant reductions in vehicle crime 
over the past decade. Eight generic 
lessons for future regulation of crime 
prevention design in consumer products 
are outlined. These lessons should assist 
policymakers to identify how the costs 
incurred by the criminal justice system in 
dealing with acquisitive property crime 
could be shifted to manufacturers, who 
arguably contribute to the problem by 
the way they design and market their 
consumer products.
Adam Tomison 
Director
Popular consumer products, such as smartphones, tablets and MP4 players are typically 
in demand on both the legitimate and illegitimate markets (Sutton 1998). While demand in 
the legitimate market will be met by the retail sector, the illegitimate market will be supplied 
by various forms of theft and in some cases, by counterfeiting. A study by Fitzgerald and 
Poynton (2011) of items stolen in burglaries in New South Wales in 2010 showed that 
consumer products were frequently stolen. Of the residential burglaries where the police 
recorded at least one object stolen, 26 percent involved the theft of a laptop, 15.3 percent 
involved the theft of a still camera, 14.6 percent involved the theft of a mobile phone 
and 10.8 percent involved the theft of a television. Rollings (2008) estimated the average 
property loss from residential burglaries in 2005 to be $1,040, some of which will no doubt 
have resulted from the theft of consumer products.
Clarke (1999) has noted that objects are more likely to be stolen when they exhibit the 
characteristics of ‘hot products’. These characteristics include availability (consumer products 
are usually readily available and this makes them available to steal), valuable (objects that are 
stolen will usually have a resale value), enjoyable (objects that bring enjoyment are often more 
likely to be stolen—hence a television is more likely to be stolen than a microwave), disposable 
(objects are more likely to be stolen if they can be on-sold with little difficulty), removable (the 
object has to be easily transported by the thief) and concealable (the object will usually be 
easy to hide and will not be traceable to the owner). One or more of these characteristics can 
make a popular item a target.
The popularity of these items for thieves can be viewed as a ‘spill-over’ effect, or economic 
externality (Breyer 1998) that derives from manufacturers’ marketing efforts by increase 
the consumer demand for their products. Unfortunately, in generating that demand, the 
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manufacturers also unwittingly create 
undesirable criminal outcomes, with the 
theft and subsequent resale of popular 
consumer products acting to satisfy at least 
part of consumer demand. The opportunity 
created by the availability of desirable and 
insecure consumer products therefore 
drives the theft of these items (Felson & 
Clarke 1998). Indeed, Farrell and Roman 
(2006) described how crime as an economic 
externality can be likened to pollution that is 
emitted by businesses and creates a social 
cost for the population in general.
When a theft does occur, it is typically 
seen as a problem for consumers, who 
bear the direct costs of the loss, as 
well as the inconvenience and potential 
emotional distress caused by victimisation. 
Such thefts also result in a significant 
cost being incurred by the state through 
the administration of the criminal justice 
system, which affects all taxpayers—both 
consumers and non-consumers of the 
products in question. For example, a study 
of the costs of crime in the United Kingdom 
in 2003–04 found that the average value of 
the property stolen in a residential burglary 
was £846, while the average cost to the 
criminal justice system for such a crime  
was £1,137 (Dubourg & Hamed 2005).
However, Scott (2005) has argued that 
sharing, or shifting responsibility for crime 
away from the criminal justice system 
towards others who can influence, or 
control crime events, can be an effective 
means of reducing crime. Indeed, if 
responsibility for the theft of consumer 
products could be shared with, or in part 
shifted to manufacturers, there could be 
significant savings to the criminal justice 
system, especially if the thefts could be 
prevented in the first instance. Indeed, 
Mazerolle and Ransley (2012) have argued 
that policymakers are already employing 
regulatory approaches with third parties 
beyond the criminal justice system as a 
means of crime control, although this has 
been somewhat piecemeal.
Unfortunately, in the context of consumer 
products, manufacturers and the designers 
they employ have often proven reluctant to 
share any responsibility for their products 
being targets of crime. Clarke and Newman 
(2005) noted that this reluctance can occur:
•	 when manufacturers are developing 
new products, before their vulnerabilities 
become known;
•	 when changes are expensive or 
inconvenient, or where their effectiveness 
is unknown;
•	 where the crimes they generate are 
considered trivial, or where there is limited 
public concern; or
•	 where the changes might be considered 
problematic for cultural reasons.
Within the context of vehicle theft (which will 
be used for illustrative purposes throughout 
this paper), Karmen (1981) documented 
a number of excuses used by motor 
manufacturers in the United States in the 
1960s and 1970s for not introducing theft 
prevention responses that focused largely 
on blaming owners for being careless with 
their vehicles. Karmen (1981) noted the 
slowness and reluctance with which motor 
manufacturers improved security during this 
period and claims that vehicle thefts were 
in the interests of manufacturers to help 
bolster sales.
There is, however, a role for government in 
encouraging manufacturers to make design 
changes that reduce the risks of theft. 
Clarke and Newman (2005) identified eight 
roles for government in facilitating product 
change. These included the government 
as bystander (allowing product change 
and taking a neutral position), as arbitrator 
(between industry and consumer groups), 
as enabler (by bringing interest groups 
together, or altering regulations to facilitate 
change), as persuader (encouraging 
manufacturers to make changes through 
force of argument), as financier (providing 
subsidies or tax incentives for products with 
the desired changes), as customer (as a 
major purchaser of goods and services the 
government can wield significant market 
pressure), as litigant (making use of the 
courts to force manufacturers to change 
their products) and as legislator (changing 
laws to force design change).
The role of government as legislator in 
encouraging design change might be 
considered one of the last (and possibly 
least desirable) policy options to use with 
manufacturers. However, there will be 
cases in which it will be in the public interest 
(Posner 1974) to introduce new regulation 
that requires changes to consumer products 
that are intended to reduce crime. This 
will be the case particularly when the 
crime-related costs to the public (both 
consumers and non-consumers) outweigh 
the costs of regulation (both to the state 
and manufacturers; Shrader-Frechette 
1991), where manufacturers are unwilling 
to voluntarily make changes and where 
the public alone is unable to pressure the 
manufacturers concerned to make the 
necessary changes (Breyer 1998). In such 
cases, government regulation may prove to 
be the most appropriate means by which 
design changes intended to reduce crime 
can be achieved. Indeed, in situations where 
manufacturers are unwilling to take unilateral 
action for fear of increasing prices in highly 
competitive markets, regulation may be 
welcomed for introducing a ‘level playing 
field’ for all manufacturers. A case in point 
was Ralph Nader’s ‘unsafe at any price’ 
campaign in the United States in the 1960s, 
which eventually brought government 
regulation on all motor manufacturers to 
improve the safety standards of the vehicles 
they sold (Newman 2004).
This paper is concerned with the regulation 
of manufactured consumer products to 
reduce crime. It draws on the experiences 
of regulating motor manufacturers to 
improve new car security. More specifically, 
it focuses on the lessons that can be 
learned from the regulation of electronic 
vehicle immobilisation, which (as is shown 
later) contributed to significant reductions 
in vehicle theft in Australia. These lessons 
could be applied to a range of desirable 
consumer products that are susceptible to 
theft, including MP4 players, tablets/laptops, 
cameras and games consoles.
Electronic vehicle 
immobilisation
Electronic vehicle immobilisation typically 
disables two or more electrical circuits 
(linked to either the ignition and/or fuel pump 
circuits) built into the engine management 
system. Although there are various 
designs (see Potter & Thomas 2001 for an 
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explanation of various types of immobiliser), 
electronic immobilisers most commonly 
work through a small transponder in the 
ignition key that transmits a weak radio 
signal, broadcasting an encrypted code  
that is picked up by a receiver located close 
to the ignition lock. When the expected 
code is received, the electronic immobiliser 
is disengaged.
In Australia, electronic immobilisers became 
a regulatory requirement on all new cars 
sold from 1 July 2001. As a result, from 
2001 onwards, the prevalence of improved 
security gradually increased as the national 
vehicle fleet aged and was replaced with 
newer vehicles, and the proportion of 
vehicles fitted with immobilisers increased 
each year. By July 2011, 71 percent of 
Australia’s vehicle fleet had been secured 
with an Australian Standard or equivalent 
immobiliser (NMVTRC 2011).
Effectiveness of electronic  
vehicle immobilisation
There is some evidence of the success of 
electronic vehicle immobilisation in reducing 
the theft of vehicles in Australia. However, it 
should be noted that such studies are often 
marked by design limitations, especially 
in relation to the use of non-comparable 
experimental and control groups, consisting 
of vehicles with and without immobilisation.
An early study of the effectiveness of 
compulsory electronic immobilisation of 
new vehicles was undertaken by Potter and 
Thomas (2001) soon after the introduction 
of the regulatory requirements. Their study 
compared the theft rates of vehicles fitted 
with Australian Standard (AS) immobilisers, 
to those fitted with non-AS immobilisers 
and those with no immobiliser fitted. The 
results showed that vehicles fitted with AS 
immobilisers had lower theft rates than other 
vehicles. Examining vehicles registered after 
1991, the theft rate for vehicles in 2000 
was found to be 29.0 per 10,000 vehicles 
registered, compared with 52.8 per 10,000 
for vehicles with a non-AS immobiliser fitted 
and 47.8 per 10,000 for vehicles with no 
immobiliser at all.
Potter and Thomas (2001) also undertook a 
separate analysis of vehicle theft patterns in 
Western Australia, where different regulation 
was introduced. Prior to the introduction of 
regulation requiring new and used vehicles 
to be immobilised from 1999 onwards in 
Western Australia, a voluntary scheme had 
operated from 1997, which encouraged 
the retrofit of immobilisers. This state-led 
scheme offered a subsidy of $30, which 
was deducted from the price of installing 
an electronic immobiliser. Following the 
introduction of the mandatory scheme in 
1999, subsidies were initially continued  
(at an increased rate of $50) for the retrofitting 
of immobilisers. These subsidies ceased  
in September 2001. Analysis by Potter  
and Thomas (2001) showed that vehicles 
retro-fitted with an AS immobiliser under  
the voluntary scheme had an average  
age of 14.85 years and a rate of theft of 
73.8 per 10,000 registered. By contrast, 
those with no immobiliser fitted were of a 
similar average age (15.61 years) but had  
a much higher theft rate, with 109.9 thefts 
per 10,000 registered.
This study was replicated by the National 
Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council 
(2007) using data for vehicles stolen in 
2006. This showed that the impact of 
electronic immobilisation had continued, 
although the size of the effect had declined. 
While vehicles less than 10 years old that 
were fitted with an AS immobiliser had 
a theft rate of 20.5 per 10,000 vehicles 
registered, those fitted with a non-AS 
immobiliser had a theft rate of 34.8 per 
10,000 and those with no immobiliser at  
all had a theft rate of 32.5 per 10,000.
A further study that focused on the 
mandatory scheme introduced in Western 
Australia in 1999 also found an impact 
associated with the introduction of 
electronic vehicle immobilisation (MM Starrs 
Pty Ltd 2002). A regression model of the 
monthly number of vehicles stolen estimated 
that the introduction of the Western Australia 
scheme resulted in an eight percent 
reduction in vehicle theft per year. This was 
attributed to a reduction in temporary theft 
(usually associated with amateur thieves 
stealing for joyriding) rather than permanent 
theft by professional thieves.
More equivocal results were provided by 
Kriven and Ziersch (2007) who examined 
changes in the stolen vehicle age curves 
for vehicles stolen in 2000 and 2004. 
If electronic immobilisation had been 
responsible for the reduction, then one 
would have expected to observe a greater 
reduction in theft rates in the years following 
the introduction of immobilisers. Kriven 
and Ziersch (2007) found that there was 
an above average decline in theft rates 
following the introduction of electronic 
immobilisation in vehicles aged under  
three years. There was also some evidence 
of target displacement towards vehicles 
less likely to be immobilised in the six to 
nine year old bracket. However, Kriven 
and Ziersh (2007) also found a second 
wave of theft reduction among vehicles 
aged 10 to 13 years (well before the 2001 
regulations were introduced), with evidence 
of displacement towards vehicles aged  
19 years or older. This pattern proved more 
difficult to explain, with suggestions that it 
was due to the introduction of regulations 
on the re-use of Vehicle Identification 
Numbers following the insurance write-off 
of a vehicle, or due to the early introduction 
of immobilisers on some models in the early 
1990s.
Similar results have been observed in the 
United Kingdom (Brown 2004; Brown & 
Thomas 2003; Farrell et al. 2010; Farrell, 
Tseloni & Tilley 2011; Lee, Wyndham & 
Fairman 2006; Webb, Smith & Laycock 
2004) and in Germany (Bässmann 2011), 
where significant reductions in vehicle theft 
were observed following the introduction 
of European Union regulations requiring all 
new vehicles sold in Europe to be installed 
with electronic immobilisers from October 
1998. In the United States, where there has 
been no regulation requiring manufacturers 
to install electronic immobilisers, such 
devices have taken longer to penetrate the 
vehicle fleet. However, there is also evidence 
to show that, where they have been 
installed, they have significantly reduced 
theft risks (Fujita & Maxfield 2012). Indeed, 
Brown (2013) identified 16 studies across 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany 
and the United States that have examined 
the effectiveness of electronic vehicle 
immobilisation, with 15 reporting a positive 
impact on vehicle theft.
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Lessons for the regulation  
of products to encourage 
crime prevention
The evidence presented here demonstrates 
that electronic vehicle immobilisation has 
been successful as a crime prevention 
innovation not only in Australia, but 
elsewhere in the world. Further, there are 
eight lessons that can be learned from the 
way immobilisers were introduced, which 
may be applicable to the regulation of 
product design by governments to bring 
about crime prevention. Each of these is 
discussed in turn.
1. Be clear about the  
problem to be addressed
From the outset, it should be clear what 
problem the proposed design change is 
intended to address and how it will be 
addressed. For example, electronic vehicle 
immobilisation could not be expected to 
prevent vehicle crime in general. While it 
could be expected to have an impact on 
thefts of vehicles, it would not affect thefts 
from vehicles, attempted thefts, tampering 
or interfering with a vehicle, or criminal 
damage to a vehicle. Neither could it be 
expected to prevent all thefts of vehicles. 
Instead, immobilisation would only prevent 
those thefts that relied on starting a motor 
vehicle without the key and driving it away.  
It would not prevent vehicle thefts employing 
other modus operandi, such as obtaining 
the legitimate key through a burglary, car-
jacking, stealing a hire car, or using a tow 
truck/low loader to remove the vehicle.
It is also important to understand the 
mechanism by which the proposed design 
change is expected to work (Ekblom 2012; 
Pawson & Tilley 1997; Tilley & Laycock 
2002). In the case of electronic vehicle 
immobilisation, the primary mechanism is 
an increase in the effort associated with 
stealing a vehicle, thereby influencing the 
decision of potential car thieves to avoid 
stealing secured vehicles. It might also 
increase the risk of detection by increasing 
the length of time taken to start a vehicle, 
thereby increasing the opportunity for being 
caught in the act of theft. However, this 
is likely to be a secondary mechanism, 
behind increased effort. Understanding 
the mechanism of change associated with 
a design change is important not only 
for understanding how a reduction in the 
problem might be brought about, but also 
for understanding why such design changes 
might fail.
2. Decide whether  
government intervention  
through regulation is required
As noted earlier, regulation by the state 
should not be undertaken lightly. There 
are various other avenues that might 
be pursued with manufacturers before 
regulation is contemplated. For example, 
Ledbury et al. (2006) provide a useful 
general introduction to policy options 
that might be applied to different types 
of problem. From the perspective of 
product design and building on Clarke 
and Newman’s (2005) eight roles of 
government (discussed earlier), a hierarchy 
of interventions similar to that proposed by 
Herman Goldstein (presented in Scott 2005) 
can be developed to provide a graduated 
response to demands for crime prevention 
in product design. These interventions 
are presented in Figure 1 and are ordered 
from least pressure exerted, which is at 
the bottom of the Figure, to most pressure 
at the top. A range of interventions are 
presented, including engagement with 
manufacturers and public awareness 
raising, through to more intensive policy 
options involving the use of government 
expenditure, regulation and litigation. Some 
of these interventions can be considered as 
‘carrots’ in the sense that they incentivise 
manufacturers to take action (eg insurers 
offering discounts, supporting research 
and development efforts, tax incentives 
and subsidies), while others are ‘sticks’ in 
the sense that they penalise manufacturers 
for lack of action (eg naming and shaming, 
and regulation). It should be noted that the 
level of intervention adopted from Figure 1 
will depend on the context of the specific 
problem and there is no expectation that 
all interventions would be tried. Further, 
progress up the hierarchy of interventions 
does not preclude the subsequent use of 
interventions lower down if circumstances 
change. However, there is an expectation 
that intervention will be graduated, 
commencing with light-touch approaches 
before proceeding to interventions that 
apply more pressure for change. This is 
important for ‘climate setting’, in which 
the conditions for future change are 
established. This, for example, can include 
shifting the underlying assumption about 
who is responsible for a problem, changing 
expectations about who should be taking 
action, or justifying the actions to be taken 
(Ekblom 2011).
The hierarchy presented in Figure 1 can 
be demonstrated with an example from 
the United Kingdom. In 1992, faced with 
record levels of vehicle crime, the Home 
Secretary at the time held a meeting 
with motor manufacturers to challenge 
them on the poor theft record of the 
vehicles they produced and to pressure 
them to improve security voluntarily. He 
also threatened to name and shame 
manufacturers who produced models 
with high theft rates (Laycock 2004). 
This resulted in the publication of the first 
Home Office Car Theft Index in the United 
Kingdom, which provided the public with 
information on the theft risks of each 
make and model of car (Houghton 1992). 
Regulation was subsequently introduced 
on a European Union-wide basis in 1995, 
under an EU Directive (95/56/EC). This 
forced manufacturers to install electronic 
immobilisers, without which their vehicles 
could not be sold in the European Union.
Experiences of engaging with vehicle 
manufacturers suggest that persuasion may 
not always be sufficient to bring about a 
crime prevention impact that is helpful to the 
general public. Legislation to regulate design 
changes was eventually required to ensure 
changes were made, but only after attempts 
to engage with the manufacturers and 
naming and shaming them for their poor 
security record.
3. The design change  
should be effective
Any design change that is made to 
consumer products should be effective 
in the sense that it reduces the problem 
it is intended to address in the way is it 
supposed to. Although this seems a truism, 
in practice, design changes often prove 
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ineffective. In the context of motor vehicle 
theft, there has been a myriad of security 
devices designed to prevent theft. These 
date back to the very early days of the 
motor car (Perry 1910), with continuous 
innovation throughout the twentieth century, 
through to the introduction of electronic 
immobilisation in the late 1980s. Most of 
these vehicle security innovations proved 
to be ineffective from the outset, or initially 
effective until vehicle thieves found the 
means to overcome or circumvent the 
technology. This is what Ekblom (1999: 
29) called a process of ‘co-evolution’, with 
design changes being met by changes in 
modus operandi by car thieves. Steering 
column locks on motor vehicles are a 
prime example of a design change that 
initially proved effective, but whose crime 
prevention effects gradually wore off as 
vehicle thieves overcame the security 
(Mayhew, Clarke & Hough 1992; Webb 
1994).
This may highlight the importance of 
design change as an iterative process that 
responds to the environment in which the 
product is being used. In the context of 
vehicle security, Southall and Ekblom (1985: 
4) described this process as an ‘arms race’, 
where manufacturers stay ahead of car 
thieves by inventing security devices that  
are then subsequently defeated by thieves 
and the cycle recommences.
From a regulatory perspective, effective 
designing out of crime needs to be 
routinised through design standards 
that clearly specify the criteria that must 
be met for the design to be effective. 
This is important from a manufacturers’ 
perspective, whereby they need to know 
how to achieve the necessary standard. 
This is particularly important where 
design standards are to be mandated 
by government and required of all 
manufacturers of a specific consumer 
product, as failure to meet the required 
standard could result in sanctions or 
blocked access to the market. Ekblom 
(1997) argued that such design standards 
should be based on performance (such 
as withstanding attack for a specified 
time), rather than fixed construction 
standards. This might allow for a range 
of solutions, rather than a single design 
that if compromised, could quickly be 
disseminated among car thieves. In the 
case of electronic vehicle immobilisation, 
the Australian Design Rule 82/00, as 
established under s 7 of the Motor Vehicle 
Standards Act 1989, clearly set out what 
was required of manufacturers. However, 
in recognition of the potential for vehicle 
security effectiveness to degrade over time, 
such standards should be reviewed and 
updated on a regular basis to take account 
of the process of co-evolution.
4. The design change should  
be convenient for the user
The introduction of a security feature to 
prevent the theft of a consumer product 
should in no way detract from the utility of 
that product. As noted by Lester (2001: 5) 
security features should not:
•	 require a significant amount of 
additional effort to be overcome by a 
legitimate operator;
•	 malfunction so that a legitimate 
operator is denied use of the product;
•	 cause an excessive increase in 
product size or mass; or
•	 contribute to any other factors likely 
to make the product unattractive to 
a user.
In ideal circumstances, the user would 
be unaware that the security feature was 
present, with the product being protected 
without the need for a user to actively 
engage the security concerned. This form of 
passive crime prevention describes the way 
in which electronic vehicle immobilisation 
works, with a driver automatically engaging 
the security when the key is removed from 
the ignition. Indeed, many drivers may be 
unaware of whether their vehicle is fitted 
with an electronic immobiliser. This can be 
contrasted with examples of vehicle security 
that require the user to actively engage 
the security, as would be the case with a 
mechanical device such as a steering wheel 
‘club’, pedal cover, or gearstick lock that 
Figure 1 Hierarchy of government interventions to encourage manufacturers to incorporate 
crime prevention measures into consumer products
Pressure applied Government intervention with manufacturers
High
Low
Bringing a civil action to compel manufacturers to take 
responsibility for the problem
Introducing legislation to regulate crime prevention action by 
manufacturers
Providing tax incentives or subsidies to encourage manufacturers 
to take responsibility for the problem
Focusing government procurement on products that incorporate 
the desired design change
Supporting research and development efforts by manufacturers to 
find solutions to a problem
Pressing for the creation of a new organisation to take 
responsibility for the problem
Creating a climate in which security becomes a signficant feature 
in the purchasing decision for consumer products, thereby 
creating competition among manufacturers
Naming and shaming manufacturers to raise public attention of 
their failure to address the problem
Collaborating with insurers to offer discounts on secured products
Raising public expectations that the consumer products they buy 
will be sufficiently secure, thereby exerting market pressure on 
manufacturers
Targeted confrontational request to manufacturers to take 
responsibility for the problem
Straightforward, informal request to manufacturers to take 
responsibility for the problem
Educating manufacturers about their responsibility for a crime 
problem
Sources: Clarke and Newman 2005, Scott 2005.
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needs to be physically applied each time the 
vehicle is left unattended.
Unfortunately, non-passive crime prevention 
measures that rely on the actions of the user 
have proven fallible; for example, incorrect 
usage of a crime prevention measure or 
failure to employ it each time. An example 
of this can be found in the use of earlier 
forms of vehicle security. Burrows, Ekblom 
and Heal (1979) reported on an evaluation 
of a crime prevention awareness campaign 
in which the researchers tested the security 
of cars in Plymouth, England, to determine 
whether security behaviour improved 
following the campaign. This involved testing 
whether doors and boots were locked and 
windows closed for a sample of cars (each 
sample consisting of 1,000 cars) examined 
before, during and after the campaign. 
No difference was found in the level of car 
security following the campaign. Importantly, 
19 percent of cars tested before the 
campaign and 19.2 percent of cars tested 
after the campaign were insecure, and in  
51 percent of cases, this insecurity was due 
to an unlocked door. In this study, around 
one in 10 consumers failed to deploy even 
the simplest security measure (a door lock).
5. Some displacement is acceptable
A common response when situational crime 
prevention measures are proposed is the 
concern that crime will simply be displaced 
from one location or target to another, 
thereby rendering the intervention pointless. 
Yet numerous studies have shown that 
displacement is by no means inevitable and 
that when it does occur, displacement is 
partial and that diffusion of benefit (where 
the crime reduction gains extend beyond 
the anticipated target) is just as likely as 
displacement (Guerette & Bowers 2009; 
Hesseling 1994; Johnson, Guerette & 
Bowers 2012).
Where electronic vehicle immobilisation  
is concerned, Brown and Thomas (2003), 
Brown (2004) and Kriven and Ziersch 
(2007) showed that there was displacement 
towards older vehicles in particular. 
However, the overall reductions in theft 
outweighed the displacement effects, which 
were only considered to be temporary until 
immobilisers had been introduced through 
the vehicle fleet.
From the outset of implementing a particular 
crime prevention measure for a consumer 
product, it should be possible to predict 
where displacement might occur. It may 
be possible to address such displacement 
with alternative measures, as was the case 
with Lee, Wyndham and Fairman (2006) 
who suggested the use of mechanical 
immobilisers (which were cheaper than 
electronic immobilisers) in high-crime areas 
to address the increase in thefts of older 
vehicles resulting from the introduction of 
electronic immobilisers on new cars in the 
United Kingdom. Alternatively, potential 
displacement could be accepted on the 
grounds that the crime reduction effects 
would outweigh the displacement effects, 
recognising that the cost effectiveness 
of a crime prevention measure would be 
diminished by displacement. However, an 
important consideration in accepting such 
displacement is an assessment of who is 
affected by it. Ideally, the crime risk should 
not be shifted towards more vulnerable 
consumers, even if the products concerned 
are of lower value. Where electronic 
immobilisers are concerned, Brown (2004) 
noted that a consequence of displacement 
towards older vehicles was a potential 
increase in the vulnerability of owners of 
low-value cars, who were less likely to 
have insurance for theft and therefore less 
resilient to victimisation.
6. The impact of a design  
change can take time
When a design change is implemented 
on an incremental basis, such as when 
new products are sold, it can take years 
to reap the crime prevention benefit of 
the change. It depends on the speed with 
which the products with the design change 
penetrate the existing stock available for 
theft. This will, in turn, depend on the life 
of a given product and the rate at which 
it is replaced. Some products have very 
long lives. For example, kitchen knives are 
rarely replaced, while mobile phones are 
often replaced on an annual basis. This 
suggests that the quickest crime prevention 
gains will be made by focusing attention 
(at least initially) on products with a short 
replacement cycle. The incremental way in 
which electronic immobilisers were rolled 
out in Australia, with all new cars receiving 
the intervention (except in Western Australia 
where used cars also received immobilisers 
when changing ownership), meant that 
it took time to secure the vehicle fleet as 
vehicles aged. Indeed, after 10 years of 
implementation, over a quarter of the vehicle 
fleet was still unprotected by an electronic 
immobiliser.
7. Effectiveness needs to be 
monitored over the long term
The fact that crime prevention impacts can 
degrade over time and that displacement 
can diminish the benefits of crime prevention 
measures, highlights the importance of 
monitoring the effectiveness of crime 
prevention in the long term. This should 
involve empirical analysis of crime prevention 
measures and how they perform in the field. 
Crime prevention measures do not always 
work as anticipated and manufacturers 
need to be aware of approaches that may 
overcome or circumvent their security. 
This may come in the form of intelligence 
from law enforcement agencies regarding 
new modus operandi being observed, 
or reports from insurance companies. 
It may also come from analyses of theft 
trends at the individual product level, as 
is currently provided on vehicle makes 
and models by the CARS database on 
behalf of the National Motor Vehicle Theft 
Reduction Council in Australia. These 
approaches should provide an early warning 
to manufacturers that changes in their 
security systems may be required. Indeed, 
manufacturers should ideally be continually 
innovating security for their products to take 
account of emerging threats. Further, the 
security should be open to upgrades during 
the product’s life as new security threats 
emerge. This would shorten the time taken 
to secure products currently in use.
8. The gains should outweigh  
the cost of regulation
Regulation clearly comes at a cost. There 
is a cost to the taxpayer for implementing 
legislative change and monitoring 
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compliance with regulation. For the 
consumer of the products in question,  
there is the additional cost of manufacturing 
a product with the required design 
change and complying with the regulatory 
requirements, which may be passed on to 
them through higher prices. These costs 
need to be weighed against the benefits 
the taxpayer derives in terms of reduced 
costs to the criminal justice system as a 
result of investigating and prosecuting fewer 
cases. There will also be benefits for the 
consumer in terms of reduced likelihood 
of victimisation and the associated costs, 
where the victim incurs inconvenience and 
replacement costs. Clearly, regulation can 
only be justified on economic grounds 
where the benefits are significantly greater 
than the costs imposed and where there 
is a failure in the market to correct the 
externality.
Recent research in the Netherlands by van 
Ours and Vollaard (2013) suggests that 
electronic immobilisers are indeed a cost-
effective form of security. While the cost 
of immobilisers was estimated at 1,500 
Euro per prevented car theft, the social and 
economic cost of a car theft was estimated 
to be between 5,000 and 12,000 Euro. On 
that basis, the benefits of electronic vehicle 
immobilisation would appear to outweigh its 
costs by a significant margin.
Transferring the lessons to 
other consumer products
The eight lessons described here are 
drawn from successful attempts to 
improve the security of one particularly 
theft-prone consumer product—the motor 
car. The extent to which such lessons 
are transferable to other consumer 
products will depend on a range of 
contextual factors. For example, the ratio 
of security costs to product price will be an 
important consideration. The lessons from 
motor vehicle security show that motor 
manufacturers are reluctant to improve 
security, even when the costs involved 
represent only a very small proportion 
of the overall manufacture cost. There is 
also the technical challenge of developing 
security solutions that are effective and yet 
do not diminish the desirability or use of the 
product by the consumer. Finally, there is the 
social desirability and demand for improved 
security of consumer products among the 
general public, especially if it can only be 
achieved through government regulation. 
As Armitage (2012) has shown, progress 
in designing out crime from consumer 
products can be slow and challenged by 
opposition at every stage.
Conclusion
It has been shown in this paper that, 
under some circumstances, where other 
approaches have proven ineffective, 
regulation can be used to bring about 
product design changes that can reduce 
crime. By examining the regulation of 
electronic vehicle immobilisation, introduced 
on to all new cars in Australia from July 
2001, eight general lessons were identified, 
which can be applied to other consumer 
products that generate crime harvests 
(Guerette & Clarke 2003; Pease 2001). 
These include the need to:
•	 understand the problem and to articulate 
how design change would address it;
•	 ensure the design change will be effective 
in addressing the problem;
•	 ensure the change does not detract in 
any way from the experience of using the 
product;
•	 accept that there may be some crime 
displacement, but that this is likely to  
be both partial and temporary;
•	 accept that design change may take a 
considerable time to show an impact, 
depending on the product life;
•	 monitor the impact over the long term; 
and
•	 assess the cost-benefits of any design 
change.
Perhaps the most important of the eight 
lessons examined here is the need to 
decide whether regulation is required, or 
whether other approaches could yield 
the same result. Government intervention 
should be viewed as a graduated process 
that encourages voluntary action by 
manufacturers before compulsory changes 
are considered.
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